An analysis of Charles Hudon
On 14 October, was held in Beijing, a meeting of the Council of Heads of Governments of Member States of the Organization Shanghai Cooperation (SCO). Issues that were discussed there came to mind that, under the guise of complete harmony, deep differences still divide China and Russia on crucial issues that prevent the organization from achieving its full maturity.
An appeal of the Taliban
At the least surprising is the evoyée open letter by the Taliban to members of the SCO: "We call it The Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Assist Countries In The Region Against colonialists and Adopt a strong stance against-the occupation of Afghanistan. "The Afghan vice-president be present at the meeting as a member of the" Contact Group for Afghanistan , the Taliban had attempted course very unlikely to bear fruit. This letter, however, can be seen as an effort to exploit the differences that remain between China and Russia about the military aspect of the organization by getting them to take an anti-Washington clear.
For Russia, the main purpose of the SCO would form a military alliance capable of counterbalancing U.S. influence in Central Asia. Ideally, Russia wants the SCO stands on a counterweight to NATO's expansionist ambitions. Clearly, Russia has very limited interest to discuss integration Economic multilaterally with these countries. Rich in natural resources, it comes easily to adjust its trade agreements bilaterally.
Discart Although Beijing does not completely the possibility that the Organization could one day play the role desired by Moscow to China, this is no time for confrontation. Starting from the premise that the modernization of China and its transformation into a global power requires maximum stability both within and outside its borders, Beijing seeks to establish good relations with all major powers of world. China is fully aware that participation in an openly anti-American organization would mean for its relations with the West, which still remains its main trading partner. Although
aroused heated discussions, the Taliban failed attempt to move the Organization's position one iota. Under cover of anonymity , an official at the meeting confided that "SCO has nothing to do with the Taliban. The opposition to terrorism is an unshakable principle of the Organization. " While the war of invasion conducted by NATO in Afghanistan is overflowing with more and more frequently in Pakistan, a traditional ally of China and member of the SCO observer, it is interesting to note that China has not used the opportunity to spend a message.
Even the Chinese public retained a strong pacifist position. A survey published on October 17 revealed that 70% of Chinese surveyed were adverse to the idea of the SCO military intervention in Afghanistan. Though Moscow would no doubt like to see emerge from this meeting a new consensus military response to the appeal of the Taliban was definitely a gamble too hazardous.
Economy foremost
The global economic crisis continues to threaten the economies of Central Asia, China was in better shape than Russia to advance its agenda within the SCO. Although the meeting did not give rise to commitments of loans spectacular, as was the case during the last summit that took place last June in Russia, China was able to still take the opportunity to consolidate its role positive economic leadership in the region.
As Highlights , we note the active role of China in relation to the acceleration of the liberalization of trade and investment between the SCO members. She advocated the establishment of projects that can benefit all member countries: strengthening transport infrastructure networks, communication systems and energy collaboration. China has also submitted a seven-point proposal for strengthening regional cooperation among member countries. This proposal aims to enhance tax cooperation, promote trade on financial and monetary policies member countries as well as putting in place measures to improve the system of regulation of international trade. The meeting also allowed to agree to accelerate the opening of a special account to solve the problems of financing major projects of cooperation for the SCO.
This context highlights the fact that for Beijing, the SCO is primarily a multilateral instrument for projecting its influence. With his message of pan-regionalism positive, the SCO can legitimize the entry of China as a major player in Central Asia (as well as to ensure a stable supply natural resources). The deployment of this "soft power" to the Chinese is not particularly the case in Moscow. Even today, Russia sees Central Asia from the perspective of a former imperial master. It retains a strong heritage and mentality sees the region as one of its spheres of influence of primary importance. Faced with loans at low interest rates as well as infrastructure development programs from China, Russia, however, include it just does not cut it. The result is a tendency to work within the SCO to counter attempts Beijing aimed at changing the organization in a more economic. In parallel, facing Beijing's reluctance to the idea of a more militaristic SCO, Moscow tries to superimpose the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an organization that China does not belong to SCO. The CSTO comprises Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Unlike the SCO, the treaty has a mutual defense capability: a rapid reaction force of 4000 soldiers.
The relationship between Russia and China within the SCO show that these two neighbors, although partners have contrasting visions of the world, different approaches to foreign policy and often conflicting priorities. While the two giants are in the SCO an effective tool to promote their respective interests, it seems clear that they do not always come together as much as they want. The global economic crisis has forced Moscow to compromise against the claims of Beijing to sponsor economically Organization. The changing geopolitical situation in Asia may soon lead Beijing to make concessions in turn for a greater level of military integration within the SCO.
For example, how to react to the SCO if NATO were to officially enter into conflict with Pakistan? Although not enjoying the status of an official member of the Organization, the traditional ally of China still enjoys official observer status since 2005. Sharing a common border with the Middle Kingdom, such an outcome would force Beijing to reconsider its position on the militarization of the SCO. Similarly, the Chinese pacifist beliefs would probably also solidly made test if Washington would one day come into conflict with Iran, the SCO observer countries in which it imports over 15% of its daily oil consumption. For now
by cons, it is clear that China is behaving responsibly in Central Asia. It seems now that there are very few clues that could suggest that China would eventually use the SCO as an instrument of neo-imperial objectives. Beijing seems rather want to use the organization as a way to minimize Russian influence, a factor that may eventually lead to a decrease in voltage across World.
Charles Hudon, Kunming
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