What clashes in the north reveal about relations between China and Burma
An analysis of Charles Hudon Last month, armed conflict broke out in northern Burma. Taking the Chinese government by surprise, who had probably not been told, about 30,000 refugees cross the border to find refuge in the Yunnan neighbor. A few weeks later, almost all refugees left China to return home. Regarding details, Rangoon, as Beijing remains could not be more discreet. Since then, no. Blocking journalism both in China and Burma. The articles on Burma on blogs in China are disappearing from the internal memory. After a reign of nearly 50 uninterrupted years, the Burmese military junta has not managed to establish its authority over its entire territory. In border areas, more than a dozen rebel groups are still evolving in parallel with the central government. Most of these groups are in the provinces of
Kachin and Shan
. The genesis of this conflict dates back to the early hours of Independence Burma. Often funded and supported by foreign powers, notably China and Thailand, these groups have managed to stand up to the central government until today.
The largest of these groups, the Army's State Wa minority, taking on an armed force of over 20,000 soldiers. After twenty years of calm, on 31 August, the junta broke the status quo and
attacked militarily autonomy to the minority ethnic Chinese Kokang . In less than a week, the resistance is suppressed. In China, the gesture is seen as an act of provocation. Ignoring repeated calls from the Chinese foreign minister urging the junta to maintain stability and the integrity of Chinese citizens living in border areas, the Burmese army continues to deploy troops in anticipation of what appears to be an attack next cons ethnic Wa. These events reveal a degree of autonomy of the junta against Beijing, which many thought was self Burma incapable.
Need a powerful ally unstable both politically and socially, caught between the geopolitical interests of India and China, isolated internationally, the junta can hardly survive without an alliance with a neighboring power. Until recently it seemed to indicate that Burma had chosen China to be his godfather at the international level. Indeed, much water has flowed under the bridge since that contacts between the neighbors were broken under Ne Win in 1962. Since the normalization of their relations in 1988, China now stands as one of the largest players in the heart of Burma's internal affairs and external. Sometimes the most cynical people even describe it as an economic colony of the empire and military the medium. In such circumstances, it seems at least surprising to see the calls to order made by China ignored by the junta. This event offers us the opportunity to ask a second look at the relationship between China and Burma.
regions of northern Burma The conflicts are currently raging in Burma took place in the Shan province, north-west. Once independence was achieved, the country descended into civil war. Armed groups refuse to submit to the authority of the nascent central government. Having pacified most of its territory, the central government is still incapable of ending ethnic separatist groups living in border areas.
China inbred maintaining relationships with some of these groups. Most groups living along the border areas between China and Burma are linked.
example, "the Burmese Shan and Dai in Yunnan are of the same origin as the Burmese Kachin, known as Jinpo Yunnan, or the Wa, who are simply the same name on both sides of the border. For centuries, they travel freely between the two countries and often maintain stronger affinities toward their ethnic groups than to the national group. In these regions, the Chinese influence is considerable. In Kokang regions, a majority of companies in fields as diverse as forestry, jewelry, hotels and entertainment is run by Chinese
. In several of these regions, the Yuan is used as a bargaining chip and it works according to Beijing time. Many Burmese border towns rely on China for services such as electricity, water and telecommunications. Despite officially
supported, financed and armed the Burmese Communist Party who was hiding in the boreal regions of the country, China has played a leading role in the pacification of the region. His role as mediator allowed the junta to sign, since the late 80's, treaties cease-fire with more than 17 of these armed groups. These cease-fire, still in force today, allowed the rebels to keep their weapons and an almost complete autonomy. For China, these autonomous areas provide a bulwark in case of instability inside Burma as well as a zone of influence privileged trade.
In China, this intimate relationship does not fail to inflame nationalist passions of many. Although not definitely not representing the position of the general population, here is a translation of a commentary that can typically read following articles dealing with the conflict in Northern Burma in the Chinese press:
Comment from Jiangsu Province, Tianjing City:
"China is too accommodating. Kokang Hanzu is filled, they speak fluent Mandarin, using Chinese cellular networks and use the area codes of Yunnan. Burma abuses openly of its ethnic minorities. This ethnic minority is precisely from its very powerful neighbor. But this all powerful neighbor adopted a pacifist position ... it's really the world upside down!
(The author then makes a parallel with how Russia incurred the respect and honor in protecting South Ossetia during the conflict with Georgia last year, and concluded:)
The weakness of China will bring disastrous results unexpectedly for its future. While the Chinese outside China need its help, China remains inactive ... "
The status quo
China is presently showing in favor of the status quo. Given the deep ethnic tensions that animate already Tibet and Xinjiang, it would be very unwise for China to support independence movements outside its borders. China objects to create such a precedent, because it fears that it arouses nationalist feelings among ethnic groups on its side of the border. However, it ensures that a certain balance of power is maintained between Border groups and the Burmese military government and that no party had the upper hand.
To do so, "several officials and intelligence officers Yunnan close relationship, though largely informal, with some of these groups, including the Kachin, Wa and Kokang. China helps to ensure their survival by providing economic assistance and keeping the border open to trade. "Despite the fact that Chinese officials deny that China is supporting militarily the minority Wa Burma, the latest report from International Crisis Group
says it was accepted that some "rogue elements" from the People's Liberation Army had done in the past.
Another aspect to consider is that a significant amount of natural resources essential for China's development is in areas currently controlled by ethnic groups, whose cooperation must be ensured. The support provided by Beijing allows it to keep these areas "open".
Several local businessmen recognize that Chinese companies benefit from "special treatments that result from a consensus with the local ethnic groups." To this end, the International Crisis Group cites the case of the forestry industry. "Large quantities of timber cut by companies with majority Chinese, using only Chinese workers, are moving from northern Burma to China daily. These actions by the Chinese logging companies are causing friction between Beijing and
Naypyidaw. Military, police, leaders of local ethnic groups and officials of the Kachin state are known to benefit directly from the timber trade, while the central government derives no profit. "
Burma annoyed Shortly after that Beijing has conveyed its requests for continued stability in border areas of Burma, the junta in Myanmar Times published a short article covering the visit of welcome made the Dalai Lama in Taiwan. This article tends to give credence to the proposition that the magnitude of differences between the two neighbors is growing. "Some experts argue that the junta would have been bitten by the tacit support given by China to the rebels and his refusal to close the border, which would have had the effect of cutting off their food."
Historically, other factors tend to explain the distance
Naypyidaw trying to deal with its Chinese neighbor. The deep distrust that maintains the Burma towards political and territorial ambitions of China is rooted in a strong aversion to the regime against any foreign intervention. By the early '60s, the Burmese government is promoting the "Burmese Way to Socialism, an ideology resolutely" anti-foreigner ", which introduced state control of the economy by nationalizing private companies. This policy specifically targeting Indian nationals, Chinese, Anglo-Burmese and the West. "These" foreigners "were" encouraged "to leave. In the late 1960s, an estimated 100,000 Chinese left Burma because of widespread discrimination. "Even today, textbooks Burmese pay particular attention to the Chinese invasion that occurred in the thirteenth and eighteenth century. More broadly, Burmese leaders have always paid special attention to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of that country. By refusing to support economic and military superpower of the time, the junta will retain strict neutrality
throughout the Cold War. The type of report that characterizes today's Burma-China relations is the antithesis of those principles of yesteryear.
One of the main reasons for this merger is in the diplomatic isolation imposed by the West to these two nations in the late 80s. The military coup, coupled with the massacre of students in 1988 in Rangoon, and the events of Tiananmen Square in June 1989 had the effect of drastically marginalize these two neighbors internationally. Beijing took advantage of this golden opportunity to fill the void policy which separated from Rangoon. Economic sanctions imposed by the West have amplified the economic difficulties in Burma, the junta decided to move closer to Beijing, focusing primarily on military and economic assistance. It is this context of "forced marriage" which leads the ruling military to remain highly vigilant against the growing power of China. Moreover, they have been trying for several years to minimize its influence in domestic politics of Burma.
To do this, in the late 1990s, Burma adopted a strategy to diversify its diplomatic partners. As success in this sense, one can mention the rapprochement with India and strengthening its ties with the nations of Southeast Asia (ASEAN). The junta also encourage Japan and other industrialized states such as Singapore and several European Union countries, to come and invest in Rangoon. From the perspective of Burma to join ASEAN and the "Forum for Economic Cooperation Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand" means integration into a regional network of cooperation between South Asia and Southeast. These comparisons allowed him to offset its reliance toward China. However, even today, the level of subordination of Burma to China remains very high. To break free and reach a level of genuine autonomy, Naypyidaw should further diversify its economic partners from industrialized countries to attract more foreign direct investment. At the same time, these transfers of capital would allow it to acquire new technologies and skills that would enable it to overcome the structural weaknesses at the source of its economic backwardness. It seems unlikely that currently cons significant number of industrialized countries be interested in acting in this direction without the military regime that engages in any political reforms that would introduce some form of democratization in the country.
The Burmese government's commitment to conduct free and fair democratic elections in 2010 could go in that direction. Such elections would allow the junta to do two things at once: to curry favor with the West while allowing it to unify the country permanently. On this side, this promise has already had the effect of creating divisions within rebel groups. Indeed, following the offer made to them to participate in elections by fielding candidates, some clan leaders are beginning to question their position autonomist hard. Side of the armed wing, the junta intends to abandon their struggle for autonomy to join the national army in what would become a new border guard. Although a majority still suspicious of the intentions in respect of central government and refuses to cooperate, the government's program represents a step forward.
Although shy, this step toward democracy has awaken a new fear in Beijing that to see Naypyidaw switch into the U.S. camp. This change would drastically alter the balance of power in Asia. Following the visit
U.S. Senator Jim Webb in Burma in mid-August 2009, speculation about improving relations US-Burma are going well. Senator Webb was able to meet the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest. He also met with President Than Shwe, for what was the first general meeting with a senior U.S. policy. The visit was followed by a full page article in the newspaper highlighting the state hopes that maintaining the junta to power improve bilateral relations and lessen the differences between the two countries. This week was the turn of the White House to allow the Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs to come to visit
U.S. . While the sanctions imposed by the West in the Scheme fails to introduce meaningful change in the direction of the country's internal affairs, the administration of President Obama is currently redefining its policy in Burma.
essential partners From a quantitative view, trade between Burma and China are uneven and asymmetric.
example, only 5% of Burmese exports are heading to China, while 34% of its imports come from the same country. To fill the economic deficit, Beijing provides weapons to the junta defends it in international forums and serves as banker. From this point of view, their relations seem reciprocal and mutually beneficial. How the junta appears to disobey Beijing on the issue of conflict in Northern Border, however, believe that leaving Naypyidaw or less satisfied with the terms of their agreement and is trying to redistribute the cards.
too important for China Burma is important for China because of its strategic location at the junction of Asia, South Asia and West Indian Ocean. Her collaboration with Burma ensures its presence in the Indian Ocean, thereby achieving its long-term
"two oceans" . In addition, a link between China and Burma is strategically useful for China to contain India's influence in Southeast Asia.
Economically, Burma is seen as a key player in the willingness of China to fill the huge disparity of wealth between the coastal of those inside. Burma is a key partner for the development of inland provinces, particularly Yunnan and Sichuan. Promote economic development in the provinces of Central and West China is a major objective of Beijing since the launch of the campaign
"Go West" , launched in 2000. The campaign aims to eradicate poverty and reduce the economic gap between the coastal provinces of China and those in Central and West in less than 50 years. "Among the ASEAN countries, Burma is currently the largest trading partner of Yunnan. In 2008, trade volume between Yunnan and Burma reached $ 1.19 billion, almost half the total trade volume between China and Burma. "Burma has vast untapped reserves of oil, gas, timber and minerals and gemstones. Chinese investment in the country focusing mainly on energy and natural resources that China crucially needed to fuel industrialization. According to a recent report
, "China is involved in at least 90 mining projects, hydroelectric, oil and gas through the countries. These projects include the construction of hydroelectric dams and a pipeline to transport gas and oil in the south to Yunnan, China. "
This pipeline is built to develop a new route for deliveries of fuel from the Indian Ocean, thus avoiding the Straits of Malacca, through which more than 70 percent of Chinese oil and gas transit . According to several Chinese analysts, too much reliance on the Strait poses two threats: the piracy and maritime terrorism in the region and the possibility, in case of conflict, see Strait completely closed by belligerent forces. The United States is, of course, approached as potential enemy, but China would not rule out the possibility that smaller states are moving in that direction. The case of Vietnam, with which China maintains disputes about sovereignty over several islands in the China Sea, is occasionally cited. In fact, it only takes a few
submarines Vietnamese to come thirsty the middle kingdom. In addition to the pipeline in order to respond to this threat, China has developed port facilities in several cities. These leave from the South China Sea, pass through the Strait Malacca to lead the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf.
From Burmese side, the record of cooperation with China is mixed. In fact, it seems increasingly clear that the rapprochement between the two countries failed to significantly develop the economy and the country's industrial base. Economic cooperation with China supports the plan but has only limited impact on the country's growth. In fact, some analysts are beginning to acknowledge that economic development in Burma is simply not going along with close cooperation with China. For Burma, several Doors seem to open up ahead. The actor most likely to compete with China for access to Burmese remains undoubtedly India.
India Given its abundance in natural resources and its importance in terms of geo-strategy for the junta to power, they are not partners spare missing. The closest competitor is definitely India. India, which had once been tempted to use its influence to some liberalization in Burma, has long since abandoned its ideological differences for more pragmatic considerations.
Strategically, India sees Burma as its neighbor a key partner that can help contain the growing influence of China in South Asia. The country is also a trump card in the heart of the Indian strategy
"Look East Policy" , which aims to create a substantial rapprochement between India and Southeast Asia. In April 2008 the two countries signed an agreement valued at 120 million
dollars to improve communication channels along the river Kaladan
and renovate the port of Sittwe. Once completed, the vessels the coastal province of India "Mizoram" will be able to navigate directly to Sittwe, opening a new trade route for goods from India to Southeast Asia, bypassing Bangladesh.
India also
sold weapons to the Burmese government and has been involved in various fields such as agriculture and telecommunications. This cooperation has enabled India to ensure support for the junta in its fight against rebels in the north-east. India is also shown particularly annoyed by the growing presence of Chinese Navy in Indian Ocean it sees as its traditional areas of influence. In addition to coming contain the expansion of China into the ocean, a reconciliation with the junta would provide a way out as land and sea to its north-eastern provinces. According to Lu
Guangsheng, Professor of International Relations at Yunnan University in Kunming, the junta would have acquiesced to demands from Beijing to wait for the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of New China to complete its ambitions in the North the country. Blocking media blackout imposed by China Naypyidaw suggests that probably would not intend to change its intervention strategy for this part of his country. The dispatch by China of massive armed forces at the border, to prevent the conflict from spilling over into Chinese territory, as was the case earlier this month, could also move in that direction.
addition to short-term interests, it seems that the only reason that China has not responded more vigorously to restore order to his servant, or that it simply did not afford she could not risk to see Naypyidaw slipping out of its orbit. Although it appears that in any event, the junta is willing to take distanced himself from its northern neighbor, too strong a reaction from Beijing would only have this phenomenon.
Charles Hudon Kunming
